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THE TRACK AND EXTERNAL COSTS OF ROAD TRANSPORT. 
 
 
1. Abstract and Summary of Results.
 
1.1.1 The purpose of this study is to review: 
 
i)Developments in methodology and data regarding issues such as 
vehicle delay, accidents, overloading and valuation of 
environmental effects. 
 
ii)The likely effect of harmonisation of taxes within the 
European Community. 
 
iii)Future prospects regarding the level of spending on roads. 
 
iv)Alternative methods of dealing with social costs, including 
lorry routing, regulation and subsidy. 
 
v)Experience elsewhere in Western Europe and in North America. 
 
1.1.2 We review the theory behind the allocation of road 
infrastructure costs, finding a number of items on which the 
current British approach can be criticised, in particular the 
treatment of capital costs on a pay-as-you-go basis. Comparisons 
with other countries suggest that the British system is 
relatively sophisticated, but this and other evidence suggests 
that the proportion of capital costs of new roads allocated to 
heavy vehicles is too low.  
 
1.1.3 A spreadsheet model of the current British track costs 
allocation system is constructed, and the effects tested of 
proposed increases in road spending, of overloading, of the 
allocation those items of cost currently allocated on a vehicle 
km basis in accordance with pcu km and of the allocation of the 
external costs of accidents. It is found that, even without 
adjusting the treatment of capital costs, an increase in taxes 
on the heaviest lorries of some 30 % is justified, and on buses 
60%. Evidence on the values of vehicle delay and environmental 
costs is examined but it is considered that these factors are 
not yet sufficiently well quantified to test the adequacy of the 
current 30% margin to allow for them. More work in this area is 
recommended. 
 
1.1.4 The possibilities for harmonisation of vehicle taxation 
within the European Community are considered. Since Britain has 
a far higher level of taxation than most other European 
countries, any move towards harmonising tax levels would reduce 
taxes in Britain at a time when they should be increasing. Such 
moves should be resisted, but if they come then there would be a 
case for compensating action to relieve competing modes of part 
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of their infrastructure costs. 
 
 
 
2. Introduction.
 
2.1.1 The purpose of this study is to review the evidence 
regarding the infrastructure and other social costs of road 
transport and the degree to which these are covered by taxes in 
the U.K., with particular reference to: 
 
i)Developments in methodology and data regarding issues such as 
vehicle delay, accidents, overloading and valuation of 
environmental effects. 
 
ii)The likely effect of harmonisation of taxes within the 
European Community. 
 
iii)Future prospects regarding the level of spending on roads. 
 
iv)Alternative methods of dealing with social costs, including 
lorry routing, regulation and subsidy. 
 
v)Experience elsewhere in Western Europe and in North America. 
 
2.1.2. From the Department of Transport's "The allocation of 
road track costs" (DTp 1989a) it is clear that the DTp's 
position is that lorries more than cover their allocated costs, 
and that the 'margin' to cover non-allocated costs (such as 
environmental costs) is sufficient to fulfil the recommendations 
of the Armitage Committee as regards taxation of lorries 
(Armitage 1980).  
 
2.1.3. These included recommendations to "increase the VED on 
the heaviest vehicles so they covered their track costs" (which 
they did not at the time of the report in 1980). "The public 
costs of accidents should be included in the calculation of 
track costs" (this has not been done). "A notional element of 
tax should be include in road track costs for damage to 
underground services. The Chancellor of the Exchequer should 
cease the then current practice of overtaxing the lightest 
lorries and in the main should take any excess of taxation over 
road track costs from the heaviest lorries since in general 
these create more environmental problems." 
 
2.1.4     Some of the methods used in the allocation of costs 
are open to debate, and new evidence now available on the extent 
of external costs may allow more accurate estimates of costs to 
be made.  Another area of concern is the level of capital 
expenditure on roads. Earlier work (Fowkes, Nash and Tweddle, 
1988) shows that public expenditure cuts during the 1980's 
effectively reduced the allocated cost of using the road system, 
at least in real terms, given that expenditure reductions were 
combined with an increase in traffic. As planned capital 
expenditure on roads has now been increased by around 25% for 
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the next few years, then either tax revenues will have to 
increase to recover such expenditure from road users, or the 
ratio by which taxes cover costs will be eroded. 
 
 
2.1.5. The pattern of expenditure on the maintenance of roads 
follows a similar pattern, though the reduction in 
reconstruction schemes (a capital expense) has to some extent 
been offset by increased minor repairs. Nevertheless, the 
results of the annual National Road Maintenance Condition Survey 
(NRMCS) clearly show that the condition of Britains roads 
deteriorated during the period 1980-85. Since then the situation 
seems to have stabilised, and may be improving as a result of 
funds being made available to tackle the backlog of maintenance. 
However, the roads are in a worse condition now than when the 
NRMCS was first undertaken in 1977 and they are carrying 
substantially more traffic. Although current expenditure on 
maintenance has increased in real terms, it has not kept pace 
with the increase in the volume of traffic, reducing costs in 
terms of vehicle kilometres. 
 
2.1.6. The extent by which taxes can be adjusted may be 
restricted by the harmonisation of road taxes within the 
European Community. However, the changes in the fuel duty and 
VED resulting from the 1990 budget indicate that the Government 
is in fact still following the guidance provided in the 1968 
Road Track Costs Report (Ministry of Transport, 1968), and by 
the Armitage Committee (Armitage 1980). That is, lorries should 
cover their track costs through a combination of VED and fuel 
duty, with a margin to provide for external costs. The 
Chancellor has tended to fix that margin at around 30%. 
 
2.1.7 In the next section, we consider the basic theory behind 
the allocation of road track costs. The following section looks 
at current practice in Great Britain; it is followed by sections 
on the U.S. and on continental Europe. We then consider the 
sensitivity of the current method of allocation to changes in 
the level of spending on roads and to changes in the treatment 
of issues such as accidents and overloading. We also consider 
the valuation of vehicle delay and congestion, and the 
environmental costs of road transport. Following this, we 
consider the likely effects of moves towards the harmonisation 
of road taxation within the European community. Finally, we 
present our conclusions. 
 
 
3. Basic Theory.
 
3.1.1      It is well-known that the efficient allocation of 
resources requires that prices be set equal to marginal social 
costs throughout the economy. This rule is particularly 
important in the case of intermediate goods such as freight 
transport, where price distortions may lead not just to 
distortions in the pattern of final goods produced but also in 
the way in which goods are produced. Although even for the 
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heaviest lorries, taxes only constitute some 20% of total 
operating cost, and overall the demand for road freight 
transport is believed to be relatively insensitive to price, 
nevertheless there are ways in which a failure to tax 
appropriately could have significant distorting effects. 
 
3.1.2     The most significant of these is probably through its 
influence on choice of vehicle type. Different vehicle types 
have very different costs, particularly in terms of road 
maintenance, and a failure to reflect this in relative tax 
levels would undoubtedly distort choice of vehicle. Secondly, 
distribution systems involve trade-offs between warehousing, 
transport and stockholding costs, and unduly low transport costs 
will lead to excessive centralisation of these systems. Thirdly, 
almost all rail freight is carried in competition with road, and 
road hauliers determine the rate that the rail operator can 
charge. At a time when British Rail is being pressed to achieve 
an 8% real rate of return on the assets it employs in its 
freight business, the future size of the rail freight industry 
will clearly be affected by the level of taxation on road 
haulage. 
 
3.1.3     If the importance of marginal cost pricing is widely 
accepted, there is more dispute about what this constitutes in 
practice. In the first place, there is a distinction to be made 
between short run and long run marginal cost. Short run marginal 
cost refers to the extra costs that will be incurred by 
expanding output with a given capital stock (or in this case 
amount of road space). Long run marginal social cost refers to 
the extra costs allowing for the optimal adjustment of the 
capital stock to the level of output. In other words, long run 
marginal cost will include the additional capital costs of 
expanding the road system, but will exclude additional 
congestion and environmental costs to the extent that these are 
offset by the extra road space provided. 
 
3.1.4     If the provision of road space were perfectly 
divisible, and the amount of road space were always optimally 
adjusted to the amount of traffic, then it can be shown that 
short run and long run marginal cost would be equal, and there 
would be no problem as to which to use as the basis of charging. 
If this is not the case, then there is a trade-off to be made 
between the advantages of short run marginal cost pricing, which 
ensures an optimal use of the current stock of roads, and long 
run marginal cost pricing, which gives appropriate signals about 
the long run costs of expanding road traffic. In a world of 
perfect knowledge, in which everyone correctly foresaw future 
price movements, short run marginal cost pricing would clearly 
be the appropriate approach. In the real world, in which people 
often base their expectations as to future price levels on 
current prices, the issue is less clear-cut. 
 
3.1.5     Whichever basis for pricing is adopted, an important 
point is that marginal social costs will vary enormously 
according to time and space. Extra traffic at peak times and on 
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heavily used parts of the network will create more congestion 
and more case for new road capacity than extra traffic at off-
peak times and on lightly used parts of the network. Similarly 
environmental costs vary enormously according to the 
characteristics of the road in question. Marginal cost pricing 
could only be accurately implemented in the context of a 
national electronic road pricing scheme, which tracked the exact 
way in which each vehicle was used. 
3.1.6    In the absence of such a road pricing scheme, the best 
that can be done is to charge some kind of average rate per mile 
for the system as a whole.   This could be administered by a 
system which simply recorded the total mileage operated by the 
vehicle, as in Scandinavia or New Zealand (see section 6.1.3). 
In practice the British system is still more crude, relying on a 
tax on fuel, plus a lump sum based on the average mileage of a 
vehicle in the class in question to make up for divergences in 
the ratio of the marginal social cost per vehicle mile and the 
fuel consumption of various types of vehicle. The result is that 
only vehicles covering the average mileage for a class of 
vehicle pay an appropriate amount of tax; low mileage vehicles 
overpay and high mileage the reverse. (It may be true that 
vehicles covering very high mileages tend to spend a greater 
proportion of their time on trunk roads and at night, and this 
might offset the above conclusion to some degree). The tax 
system is particularly a problem for operators of vehicles 
engaged in inter-modal work, and there may be a case for a 
remission of a part of VED in the case of vehicles engaged in 
this work (this is already allowed by EC regulations in the case 
of road vehicles engaged in piggyback traffic). 
 
 
4. The Track Costs Allocation System in the U.K.
 
4.1 The Basis of the Current System. 
 
4.1.1 The practice currently used by the DTp in dealing with 
track costs is a cost allocation exercise under which all costs 
they consider to be public costs are allocated to individual 
types of vehicle. The system of allocation used dates back to 
the 1968 Road Track Costs report (Ministry of Transport, 1968) 
which was endorsed (with some updating of evidence) in the 1976 
Transport Consultation Document (DoE, 1976).  
 
4.1.2 In the 1968 Road Track Costs Report costs were placed in 
three categories. User costs are those which directly fall on 
road users, such as petrol, and tyres, as well as the time 
involved in travelling. Public costs consist mainly of road 
construction and maintenance, and fall upon central and local 
government. Other costs occasioned by road users do not fall on 
the road user or the government and are classed as community 
costs. Some costs fall within two, or all three categories, an 
example being accident costs. 
 
4.1.3 The report recommended allocating only the public costs of 
road usage, using Long Run Marginal Cost (LRMC) pricing. The 
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basic method is to identify any cost component which can be said 
to be incurred by a particular class of vehicle and to charge 
those costs items to the relevant classes of vehicles. Fifteen 
percent of capital costs are shared between heavy vehicles 
according to the kilometres they run weighted by their gross 
weight on this basis. Other capital costs are shared out 
according to pcu km. Maintenance costs such as pavement 
reconstruction are allocated according to standard axle km. The 
definition of a standard axle takes account of the 'fourth power 
law' relating road damage done by axle weights applied. The 
exact definition is complicated by a switch from imperial to 
metric measurements, so we shall quote the DTp definition (DTp 
1968, p3): 
 
"A Standard axle is a computational device for comparing the 
damaging effects of different vehicles, taking account of 
the 'fourth power law' of road pavement damage. The 
'Standard Axle' value of a particular vehicle can be 
calculated by summing the fourth powers of the weights (in 
tons) on each axle, and dividing by 10 to the power 4 (ie 
10,000). Thus for a fully laden 16 tons, 2 axle rigid 
vehicle with estimated axle weights of 6 tons and 10 tons, 
the 'Standard axles' would be:- 
 
6x6x6x6 + 10x10x10x10     1296 + 10000 
---------------------  =  ------------  =  1.1296 imp. tons 
     10x10x10x10             10000 
 
ie. the vehicle does 1.1296 times as much damage to the road 
pavement as a 10 tons axle. In this paper, axle weights 
quoted in metric tonnes have been used to calculate 
'Standard axles' and the divisor has been 10.16 to the 
power 4, ie 10 imperial tons, 22400lb." 
 
Some other maintenance costs are allocated according to average 
gross weight km. Those costs which remain are shared between all 
classes of vehicles according to vehicle kilometres run. Since 
1984, the entire exercise has been undertaken separately for 
four classes of road; Motorway, Trunk, Principal and Other. The 
1989/90 allocations are shown in detail in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
 
4.1.4 Clearly this method would only account for the public costs 
associated with the use of roads. External costs were not taken 
into account except via maintenance of a margin between taxes 
and allocated costs. Even so the U.K. is one of the few 
countries to attempt to make any allowance for these external 
costs in its system of taxation of road vehicles. 
 
 
4.2 Adequacy of the Method.
 
4.2.1 That road vehicles should pay for the use of the roads is 
generally accepted. Objections to the method are of three types. 
Firstly, is apportionment of costs between the various classes 
of vehicle correct, eg. should the total cost of winter 
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maintenance be allocated equally by vehicle kilometres when some 
evidence shows that a combination of freezing conditions and 
heavy axle loads may be responsible for the damage? In any event 
should any costs be allocated by vehicle kilometres when, if 
they are truly a part of the marginal cost of providing road 
space, they must surely be related to the amount of road space 
provided and this is related to P.C.U. kilometres rather than 
vehicle kilometres? 
 
 
Table 4.1 Road Costs for 1989/90 Classified by Road Class and 
Parameter.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Allocation of Road Track Costs 1989/90. DTp, London. 
 
 
Table 4.2. Maintenance Costs for 1989/90 Classified by Road Type 
and Expenditure Item.
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Source: The Allocation of Road Track Costs 1989/90. DTp, London. 
4.2.2      Secondly, arguments surround the treatment of capital 
costs. At present, current capital expenditure (or more strictly 
the average of spending in the current and the two adjacent 
years) is spread over the traffic level of the year in question. 
This is a very curious way of treating capital costs, which 
should surely be spread over the life of the road, but related 
only to the extra traffic carried. For instance, let us make 
some very simple assumptions. Suppose that roads have an 
infinite life, so that the only cost of investing in them is the 
fact that capital is tied up. This capital may be assumed to 
have an opportunity cost of 8% p.a.in real terms (8% is the 
required rate of return on new road investment, and also the 
rate of return required on all rail assets including 
infrastructure). Thus the economic cost of investing £100m in 
new roads today is 8% of this sum, or £8m per annum 
indefinitely. Suppose also that the current level of capital 
spending on roads is just sufficient to cope with the current 
rate of growth of traffic, of say 4% per annum. This would imply 
that an annual cost of 8% of the current roads budget is 
incurred to provide capacity equal to 4% of existing traffic 
levels. This would suggest that marginal capital costs per unit 
of traffic are of the order of double the figure given by the 
existing process of spreading actual capital spending over total 
traffic levels in the year in question.   
 
4.2.3 Thirdly, arguments surround the allocation of external 
costs. Is the arbitrary 30% supplementary charge on the 
calculated track costs adequate? In any case the DTp appear to 
interpret this percentage as an average over all HGV's, with 
some categories of lorry having a revenue/cost ratio of less 
than 1.30:1. 
 
4.2.4 Over time improved evidence of individual items of external 
cost have become available, such as the costs of accidents. If 
this evidence is considered to be robust, then those external 
costs quantified should be allocated on a specific basis. 
 
4.2.5 The sensitivity tests we have carried out (section 7) show 
that these arguments can have a profound effect on the overall 
allocated costs of road use. In particular the allocation of the 
costs of road accidents, accepted by the government for use in 
planning road improvements but not included in track cost, 
almost wipes out the external element before consideration is 
given to pollution and congestion. 
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4.3 Recent Sources of Evidence.
 
4.3.1 During the last decade the increasing awareness of 
environmental effects have lead to a number of studies into 
specific issues. Some were directly related to road track cost 
issues, though many are the by-product of other studies. 
 
4.3.2 One important source of data has been the work carried out 
into the valuation of life (Jones-Lee, 1985, 1987). Using Stated 
Preference survey methods, the results produced gave much higher 
valuations on a 'willingness to pay' basis than the previously 
used Human Capital approach. Unfortunately there is a large 
disparity between the average figure for the cost of a 
statistical life and the median, the authors recommending the 
use of the latter. We have followed their recommendation in 
carrying out the sensitivity tests. However, one study (Newbery, 
1987) does use the average figure. 
 
4.3.3 An area of some concern is that the DTp allocation method 
relies for its information on the average weights of goods 
vehicles on a survey using data supplied by HGV operators. For 
obvious reasons, this does not disclose the extent of 
overloading taking place. The most unbiased data on overloading 
we have been able to produce is a survey undertaken in Cheshire 
(Urquart, 1987), and this data has been used in one sensitivity 
test. 
 
4.3.4 In some countries the effect of weathering is an important 
factor. Conflicting evidence has been produced concerning this, 
results of a study in Brazil indicating that roads deteriorate 
even if they are not used, or used very little (Newbery, 1987). 
On the other hand evidence from U.S.A. would indicate that the 
excessive wear experienced, particularly in conditions of frost 
and moisture, is a combination of standard axles and weather 
conditions (Small, Winston & Evans, 1989). If it was accepted 
that some deterioration was caused by weathering, then these 
costs should be allocated by pcu km and not standard axle km.. 
This would clearly reduce the share of costs allocated to heavy 
goods vehicles. 
 
4.3.5      We shall consider the implications of changing some 
of these assumptions in section 7. But first we survey existing 
approaches to the subject in the U.S. and continental Europe, to 
see what may be learned about alternative approaches, and in 
particular what the implications of tax harmonisation in Europe 
might be. 
 
 
5. Recovery of Expenditure on Roads in U.S.A.
 
5.1 Current Method.
 
5.1.1 Currently the U.S.A. adopts similar allocation procedures 
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to those used in the U.K., "cost allocation on the basis of cost 
occasioning" (U.S. Federal Highway Authority, 1982). The policy 
means those vehicle groups giving rise to capital expenditure 
should pay for that expenditure; thus thicker or wider pavement 
costs are allocated to lorries, more road capacity to traffic in 
general on an incremental basis. 
 
5.1.2 In some respects, the method appears to be not quite so 
sophisticated in its fine detail as that used in the U.K. For 
example, though some data is collected on vehicle use this is 
not used in such detail as is the Continuing Survey of Road 
Goods Transport (CSRGT) in Britain. The figures quoted in the 
American report are somewhat distorted in that there is a 
greater use of toll roads, and by the fact that large vehicle 
revenues are collected by state and local government. The 
position relative to Federal Highways is given in Table 5.1 with 
regard to total revenue per vehicle in 1977, together with an 
estimate for 1985. 
 
5.1.3 From this table it is apparent that, to a greater extent 
than in the U.K., there tends to be some degree of cross-
subsidisation of heavier lorries by lighter vehicles. Thus the 
U.S. equivalent of a 38 tonne artic (say 80 kips) does not cover 
its track costs, whereas a large rigid more than covers its 
costs. 
 
5.1.4 Note should be made that U.S. practice does not include an 
allowance to cover external or environmental costs. Also, 
although the gross weights of vehicles are higher than the 
maximum in many parts of Europe, individual axle weights tend to 
be lower. 
 
 
Table 5.1. Annual User Payments per Vehicle ($).
_____________________________________________________________ 
         1977     1985 
      $ Ratio $ Ratio 
 
Cars      37  1.1   25  1.0 
M/c       3  0.5    3  0.6 
Buses    86  0.5    6  0.0 
Vans      49  1.2   40  1.1 
 
Single unit trucks GVW 
<26 kips        105  1.3      132  1.7 
>26 kips        405  1.7      554  2.2 
 
Combination trucks GVW 
<50 kips        569  0.8      798  1.2 
50-70 kips      889  0.9     1292  1.3 
70-75 kips     1331  0.6     1663  0.8 
>75 kips       1452  0.5     1819  0.6 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Note:- 1 kip is 1000 U.S. pounds. 
Source: U.S. Federal Highway Cost Allocation Study, 1982.   
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5.1.5  The taxes on vehicles are mainly a duty on fuel (the 
report advising that consideration be given to a higher tax on 
derv than gasoline), and a highway use tax for heavy vehicles 
(equivalent of VED) of $3 per 1000 pounds for all trucks greater 
than 26 kips GVW. However, unlike the U.K., this is not 
graduated by weight or number of axles. Another proposal of the 
report was the introduction of weight*distance taxes which were 
already in use in the state of Oregon. However, these do not 
distinguish between roads of various pavement strengths, taxes 
being based on the average, and would involve operators keeping 
accurate records for tax purposes. 
 
5.1.6 The 1982 study examined three methods of cost allocation. 
It recommended the 'uniform removal technique' for pavement 
thickness of new facilities, and estimated pavement wear 
functions for traffic related pavement rehabilitation; the 
'incremental method' for bridge strength of new bridges, a 
special function for load related bridge replacement, and 
incremental assignments for grade steepness and road width. 
Residual costs within cost assignment groups would be allocated 
by vehicle miles travelled (vmt). 
 
5.1.7     The first method, the "uniform removal technique", 
assessed the additional capital costs of increasing the 
thickness of pavements to withstand increased axle weights. 
These additional costs would then be allocated directly to the 
classes of vehicles involved. 
 
5.1.8 The second method, 'incremental technique' grouped all 
pavement costs, which were allocated in a fifteen stage 
incremental approach using axle miles travelled to allocate 
intra incremental costs. Bridge costs, and width and grade costs 
were allocated as per the recommended method. Residual costs and 
costs remaining within group costs were assigned by vmt. This 
method seems the nearest to the U.K. system of those examined. 
 
5.1.9 The third alternative examined was 'short run marginal 
costs' (SRMC). It differs from the other two in that expenditure 
on building roads is ignored, while variable costs for each trip 
are estimated. These comprise pavement damage and associated 
user operating cost changes; travel time and accident increases 
due to traffic, administration and maintenance costs that are a 
function of traffic, and traffic related environmental damage.  
 
5.1.10 The practise in the U.S.A. has been acceptance that 
the highway system has considerable non-user benefits, and the 
use of general taxation for highway expenditure can be justified 
on this basis. The report estimates that of total Federal plus 
State and local highway expenditure, the user share was 70.9% 
and the non-user share 29.1%. 
 
5.1.11 Obviously non-users benefit from improvements to the 
economy in general resulting from an efficient road system. 
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However, these benefits are largely those enjoyed by goods 
vehicle operators, passed on through competitive markets. Most 
studies of the effects of road schemes on economic growth in 
Great Britain have concluded that there is no significant 
further effect that needs to be taken into account (Parkinson, 
1984) 
 
 
5.2  Criticism of U.S. Method.
 
5.2.1 Economists generally favour the short run marginal cost 
(SRMC) approach to charging for the use of roads. This was the 
case in the main critique (Small, Winston & Evans, 1989) of the 
U.S. Highway Cost Allocation study. 
 
5.2.2 If the capital stock is optimal, the short or long run 
marginal cost approaches should give similar results. However, 
Small et al argue that substantial investment would be needed to 
bring the two close together. This would be required to improve 
the long term durability of the road network. 
 
5.2.3 In the long run they propose that costs can be reduced by a 
radical change in the charging system. This requires a shift 
from the current method of reliance on fuel taxes and weight 
graduated licence fees, to one based on direct mileage charges 
graduated with respect to axle loads. The authors assume that 
this approach would encourage truckers to switch their heavier 
loads to vehicle types which have more axles, and reduce road 
damage as a result. It is not clear whether the effect of 
reduced payload which would result from this change has been 
taken into account; it is possible that it would be more 
economical for truckers to simply pay the higher charges and 
continue using the existing type of truck. 
 
5.2.4 The authors have calculated that the cost coverage in the 
U.S.A. for the years 1975, 1980 and 1985 was 65.0%, 61.2% and 
62.0% respectively inclusive of State and local taxes. They also 
claim that the relationship of pavement wear to axle weight 
rises at a rate closer to its third power, rather than its 
fourth based on re-analysis of the AASHO test data allowing for 
residual life of some sections of pavement when the tests were 
completed. 
 
5.2.5 Congestion charges would be charged separately from 
pavement wear. This reflects the fact that roads are a multi-
product business; peak auto travel requiring capacity, and truck 
travel requiring durability. 
 
5.2.6 Having produced a theoretical SRMC model, the authors 
simplify it to make it more easily applicable to actual 
conditions. In doing so, the system would become less efficient 
as well as being a less convenient way of collecting road taxes 
than those currently in use. Perhaps the conclusion of the 1982 
Federal Highway Cost Allocation Study was correct; SRMC is not a 
practical method of raising revenue. However, it should be 
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stressed that the practical problems in obtaining a true LRMC 
system are almost as great; neither the US nor the UK system as 
currently practised really conform to LRMC pricing principles 
either. 
 
5.2.7      In conclusion then the U.S. system is not all that 
different from that in use in the U.K. However, it is worth 
noting the much greater attention posed in the U.S. system to 
the incremental capital costs of thicker pavements, wider lanes 
and stronger bridges required by heavy vehicles. It is likely 
that this leads to a much greater share of the capital costs of 
new roads being allocated to heavy vehicles than is the case in 
the U.K.. It should be noted that a study of car only roads, 
which took account of such factors as well as effects on 
necessary gradient and curvature concluded that car only roads 
could be built for some 75% of the cost of existing roads, 
rather than 85% as assumed by DTp. (Echenique, 1987) 
 
 
 
6. Continental Practice.
 
6.1 Variation in Approach.
 
6.1.1 Within Europe, including Scandinavia, each country uses 
different methods to recover expenditure on its highway system. 
There is also a large degree of variance of the proportion of 
road costs users of different categories of vehicle pay. In many 
countries it is considerably less than the total costs of using 
the road, and few countries incorporate a surcharge to cover 
external costs. 
 
6.1.2 The main sources of road taxation throughout Europe are 
fuel taxes, together with some fixed element tax. The amounts 
payable as tax varies enormously, those on derv being shown in 
Table 6.1. 
 
6.1.3 In addition a few countries impose weight-distance taxes on 
various classes of vehicle, notably goods vehicles. These 
include Norway, Sweden and Finland. In Norway a typical 38 tonne 
GVW vehicle would pay 0.19 ecu/km whereas in Sweden it would pay 
0.7 ecu/km.  
 
 
Table 6.1 Tax on Derv (ecu/100lt) in 1984.
___________________________________________________________ 
 
Denmark      4.42 
Fed. Rep. of Germany  19.75 
France     17.58 
Italy     7.79 
Netherlands     7.91 
Norway      0.37 
Switzerland    33.60 
Sweden      7.97 
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U.K.      24.52 
____________________________________________________________ 
£1 = 1.6931 ecu. 
Source: ECMT Round Table 71, "International Road Haulage: 
Taxation Systems." ECMT, Paris 1986. 
 
 
6.1.4 Though outside Europe, this form of goods vehicle taxation 
has been applied in New Zealand where operators buy a licence 
for each 1000 kilometres covered by a particular vehicle. For a 
40 tonne articulated lorry of the 3+2 axle configuration this 
costs $11.79. This tax does not take account of the weight 
actually being carried (Starkie D. 1989). However, evasion is 
perceived to be widespread; even with hubodometers it is 
difficult to determine whether a lorry has paid for the distance 
it is covering, unless large scale inspection is imposed.  
 
6.1.5 The most recent set of calculations of the marginal social 
costs of road traffic for Sweden are interesting for two 
reasons; firstly, they are based on SRMC (including congestion 
but not capital expenditure), and secondly, they include 
explicit quantification of the environmental and accident costs 
(Hansson and Nilsson, 1989). The results of these calculations 
are shown in Table 6.2. 
 
6.1.6 Environmental costs include noise and air pollution, 
valuation of the former being based on the hedonic price 
technique, and of the latter on the cost of alternative methods 
of achieving specific targets for reductions in nitrous oxides, 
hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide (including fitting catalytic 
converters). An air pollution tax is also levied on diesel fuel 
used by the railways. 
 
6.1.7 The result of these calculations is that, even though road 
haulage taxes in Sweden appear high by international standards, 
they fall far short of covering marginal social costs even in 
rural areas (see Table 6.3) 
 
6.1.8 Items of taxation which are included as being recovery of 
highway expenditure also vary from one country to another; 
Belgium even including car radio licence fees (ECMT 1989). In 
some countries variable rates of turnover tax (or VAT) apply to 
road vehicles and spares, and any supplement above the standard 
rate can be construed as being specifically road taxation. 
 
 
Table 6.2. Social Marginal Costs for Road Traffic 1987.
   (ore/km, 1987 price level) 
_______________________________________________________________ 
    Private car  Truck Bus 
       Rural  Urban Rural  Urban Rural  Urban
  
 
Road    0.8    0.7  31.8   23.0  27.8   20.1  
maintenance 
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Traffic     1.1    1.1   1.1    1.1   1.1    1.1 
surveillance 
Congestion  0.8   18.0   5.5   54.0   2.2   54.0  
 
Accidents   11.0   38.0  15.0   46.0  16.0  148.0 
 
Environmental   6.5   29.0  27.5   68.0  23.0  161.5 
impact 
Total   20    87  81    192   70    386 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Notes:    
i) 100 ore=1 SEK=£0.094 at May 1989. 
 
ii) Road maintenance costs for trucks (22.5 tons) and buses (16 
tons) are mean values for different axle combinations. 
 
iii) Environmental impact for car with no catalytic converter; 
equivalent values if fitted are 1 and 5 ore. 
 
Source: 'A New Swedish Railroad Policy'. Hansson L. and Nilsson 
J-E. Paper presented at Fifth World Conference on Transport 
Research, Yokohama, Japan, 1989. 
 
Table 6.3. Road User Charges as a Percentage of Social Marginal 
Costsin Sweden 1987.
______________________________________________________________ 
       Rural  Average Road Traffic 
      Traffic (incl. urban areas) 
Private car: 
With catalytic converter    93     45 
Without catalytic converter   76     65 
Truck      70     50 
Coach      55     40 
Bus        --     10 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Source: 'A New Swedish Railroad Policy'. Hansson L. and Nilsson 
J-E. Paper presented at Fifth World Conference on Transport 
Research, Yokohama, Japan, 1989. 
 
 
6.1.9 The operation of HGV's in Europe is affected in other ways, 
mainly in a wide variation in regulations between countries. 
Some countries within the EC are totally de-regulated, and in 
the U.K. and the Benelux countries road transport operators have 
complete commercial freedom. Regulations controlling safety and 
some environmental restrictions apply. 
 
6.1.10 Probably the only country in which quantity regulation 
of hauliers is still effectively enforced is the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Germany controls the numbers of vehicles 
public hauliers can use for long distance work, making expansion 
difficult. The tariffs charged are also controlled within a 
'fork'. These practices will presumably cease with completion of 
the Single European Market, although the limited arrangements 
for cabotage so far agreed are unlikely to overturn them, and it 
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seems likely that regulation will survive in Germany beyond the 
end of 1993. 
 
6.1.11 The position in France is one of rapid de-regulation 
of road transport. At one time France, like Germany, partly 
justified control of road transport as a way of protecting the 
rail network, but quantity and tariff restrictions have now 
effectively disappeared. 
 
6.1.12 Trans-Alpine traffic between EC countries is 
controlled in both Austria and Switzerland, mainly by night and 
weekend movement restrictions. There are exemptions to these 
aimed at allowing movement of domestic traffic. In the case of 
Switzerland there is also a maximum GVW of 28 tonnes. However, 
there is some pressure from Swiss manufacturers to have this 
weight increased as retaliatory action by neighbouring states 
has reduced their competitiveness. 
 
6.1.13 Nevertheless, regulatory factors have probably had a 
greater effect on freight mode choice than a road taxation 
system which recovers HGV track costs. This is most marked in 
the case of German domestic traffic, and traffic between Italy 
and the rest of the EC. 
 
6.2 Comparison of Taxation Levels.
 
6.2.1 Because of the wide variation both in methods of collecting 
road taxes, and the approach to the subject, comparison between 
European countries is difficult. However, one study has 
attempted to determine the costs of operating a typical 38 tonne 
GVW vehicle, a size popular both in international haulage and 
approximating the maximum size lorry widely used in many 
countries (ECMT, 1986). 
 
6.2.2 Even within the constraint of a particular size of vehicle, 
the 'reference vehicle' in this study was markedly different 
between countries. In Scandinavia the three plus three axle 
drawbar combination was the vehicle for which costs were 
produced. In Germany it was also a drawbar, but with a 16 tonne 
tractor and 22 tonne trailer. The Swiss gave an average of three 
different axle combinations of 28 tonnes, their maximum weight; 
though the tax level also varies between Cantons. The U.K. 
reference vehicle was a 2+3 axle artic, whereas the French 
costed a 2+2 axle artic.  
 
6.2.3 In order to produce comparative figures between countries, 
we assumed that the reference vehicle in each country achieved 
the same mileage per year (74,000 kms) and fuel consumption 
(2.08 kms/lt). The revenue per annum per vehicle could then be 
produced as shown in Table 6.4. 
 
 
Table 6.4. European Highway Revenue/Cost Ratios.
_______________________________________________________________ 
      Duties    Revenue/Cost 
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    Fixed Fuel  Total Ratio 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Denmark    3200 1537 4773 0.41 : 1 
F.R. Germany   4185 7026 11211 0.96 : 1 
France     760 6255 7015 0.60 : 1 
Italy    375 2771 3146 0.27 : 1 
Netherlands   1625 2814 4439 0.38 : 1 
 
Norway    2650  132 2780 0.24 : 1 
(Incl km. tax)       (14060) 16842 1.44 : 1 
Switzerland   1320 11954 13274 1.14 : 1 
Sweden    2000 2836 4836 0.41 : 1 
(Incl km. tax)       (51800) 56636 4.85 : 1 
 
U.K.     5185 8708 13893 1.19 : 1 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Notes: i) Assumes rates of duty as per ECMT Round Table 71. 
      ii) Lorry averages 74,000 km. per year at consumption of 
  2.08 kms/lt. 
     iii) Track costs equal £93.15 (157.71 ecu) per 1000 km. 
 
 
6.2.4 The costs occasioned by the use of the vehicle on the road 
was also assumed to be the same as for a 38 tonne artic in the 
U.K. This is £93.15/1000 km (DTp, 1985), or 157.71 ecu/1000km.; 
11,670 ecu per year. 
 
6.2.5 In the analysis of the ratios in Table 6.4 many assumptions 
have been made. It is unlikely that the 'reference vehicle' in 
the various countries will have the same standard axle weights 
as that of the U.K. Fuel consumption will vary, mainly because 
of traffic conditions, quality of roads and terrain. Many 
European countries are thought to have stronger pavements than 
in the U.K. If these are nearer to the optimum durability for 38 
tonne lorries, then the track cost figure will be lower. 
 
6.2.6 Another factor is the extent to which heavy vehicles use 
toll roads whose revenue is not included in the revenue/cost 
ratios. Such roads are fairly extensive in Italy; less so in 
France. In most other countries tolls only apply for the use of 
short sections of the network, such as river crossings. Many of 
these major pieces of infrastructure operating in deficit. 
 
6.2.7 Nevertheless, even when allowance is made for the 
differences between the countries involved, it seems very likely 
that there is a considerable difference in the rate of highway 
cost recovery in Europe, with the level of taxation and of cost 
recovery being very much lower than in the U.K. This is 
obviously of some concern in the light of possible proposals to 
harmonise tax levels within the EC, an issue considered further 
along with other sensitivity tests in the next section. 
 
 
7. Testing the Sensitivity of the Current U.K. Allocations
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7.1 Calibration of the Model.
 
7.1.1 Using a proprietary spreadsheet for a micro computer, the 
figures published in 'The allocation of road track costs 
1989/90' (DTp 1989a) have been used to calibrate a model, the 
published figures being compared with the base position of the 
computer model in Table 7.1. The slight differences are the 
result of using fewer classes than in the DTp estimates. It 
should be noted that these figures follow the usual D.Tp. 
practice of ignoring the fact that fuel tax on local bus 
services is entirely rebated. The results have been subjected to 
a number of sensitivity tests. In some cases these test the 
allocation of the current level of expenditure on roads, whilst 
others examine the effect of an increase in such expenditures, 
or the effect of inclusion of specific external costs. Since 
these sensitivity tests were completed the DTp have published 
'The allocation of road track costs 1990/91'. Some of the 
resulting revenue tax ratios have changed significantly in the 
most recent edition as shown in Table 7.7. These are partly the 
result of revenue changes in the budget, which were tested in 
the model, but also the result of adjustment to the mileage 
travelled on various classes of road, the most notable being for 
large rigid vehicles. 
 
7.1.2 The external costs of road transport (such as environmental 
costs) are only covered to a limited degree by tax revenues from 
road vehicles. These external costs are largely covered by 
adding, on average, 30% to the track costs of goods vehicles, as 
calculated by the DTp. Where more specific data can be obtained 
to assess the extent of these external costs sensitivity tests 
have also been carried out. 
 
 
Table 7.1 Calibration of Model.
_____________________________________________________________ 
Vehicle class Tax/cost ratio. 
     DTp figures  Base figures 
 
 
Cars + vans   3.4   3.35 
Buses + coaches  1.1   1.02 
HGV Rigids 
2 axle 7.5t2.00   1.99 
2 axle 17t1.14   1.15 
3 axle 25t1.16   1.14 
4 axle 31t1.17   1.15 
HGV Artics 
2+1 axle 25t1.43   1.41 
2+2 axle 28t1.42   1.43 
2+2 axle 32.5t1.27   1.28 
2+3 axle 38t1.36   1.34 
3+2 axle 38t1.38   1.36 
3+3 axle 38t1.46   1.45 
_____________________________________________________________ 
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7.2 Increased Expenditure on Roads.
 
7.2.1 The Government have decided to increase the expenditure on 
roads in real terms over the next few years (DTp 1989b). This is 
partly to undertake the backlog of maintenance that is now 
required, though the major change is an increase in capital 
spending, particularly on new roads or substantial modifications 
to stretches of existing roads to increase capacity (HM Treasury 
1990). The expenditure plans are shown in Table 7.2. 
 
 
Table 7.2. Planned Expenditure on Roads 1990-91 to 1992-93.
  (by Central Government on national roads system). 
_______________________________________________________________ 
      £ million. 
   1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93
  
 
Current    102   93  120  130  140 
Capital    897 1301 1694 1770 1850     Administration
    93  105  121  130  140  
_______________________________________________________________ 
Source: The Governments Expenditure Plans 1990-91 to 1992-93, 
Chapter 7-Department of Transport. HM Treasury, London, 1990. 
 
7.2.2. It is clear that from 1990 that the increase in 
expenditure is of the order of 23%, allowing for inflation at 6% 
during the current year and 4.5% thereafter. The cost of 
administration is expected to rise at about 7.5% per annum in 
real terms. 
 
7.2.3. Some items of expenditure considered  to be capital by 
HM Treasury are in the maintenance budgets of the DTp. These 
cover reconstruction, haunching, resurfacing, surface dressing, 
skid treatments, bridges, and remedial earthworks on motorways 
and trunk roads. In the road track cost allocations over recent 
years, capital expenditure has formed about two thirds of the 
total on national roads. For our sensitivity test we have 
adjusted the increased total spent on motorways and trunk roads 
so that 67% is of a capital nature (as defined by the DTp), the 
balance being current expenditure. Thus maintaining the current 
proportions. 
 
7.2.4. We have thus increased expenditure on national roads 
in our model of the 1989/90 Road Track costs by 23% while 
leaving local roads at the same level of spending. The results 
are shown in Table 7.3. While most classes of vehicle still 
cover their allocated track costs, large rigid HGV's and buses 
are not providing any margin to cover any external costs. For 
some categories of HGV's tax revenues would need to be increased 
by almost 30% to provide the currnet 30% margin; buses and 
coaches do not do so at the present time anyway.  The four and 
five axle artics (with two axle tractors) would face increases 
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of between 15% and 20% in tax revenues in order to provide a 30% 
 margin for external costs. 
 
 
Table 7.3 Effect of Increased Expenditure on DTp Roads.
_____________________________________________________________ 
Vehicle class Tax/cost ratio. 
     DTp   Base    Expenditure  
   figures   figures +23% 
 
Cars + vans   3.40  3.35  3.14 
Buses + coaches  1.10  1.02  0.99 
HGV Rigids 
2 axle 7.5t2.00  1.99  1.83 
2 axle 17t1.14  1.15  1.08 
3 axle 25t1.16  1.14  1.07 
4 axle 31t1.17  1.15  1.05 
HGV Artics 
2+1 axle 25t1.43  1.41  1.27 
2+2 axle 28t1.42  1.43  1.22 
2+2 axle 32.5t1.27  1.28  1.10 
2+3 axle 38t1.36  1.34  1.12 
3+2 axle 38t1.38  1.36  1.15 
3+3 axle 38t1.46  1.45  1.22 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
7.2.5. The result of this sensitivity test indicates that the 
standstill period on increased road vehicle taxation may be at 
an end, and that the annual budget speech for the next few years 
will contain increased rates of fuel duty (as did the speech in 
1990), or VED, or both. It should be remembered that the 
allocation of track costs is based on a three year average 
figure, therefore, the full impact of the increased expenditure 
will not take effect until 1992-93. We have argued previously 
(Fowkes, Nash and Tweddle 1988) that the main reason for the 
fall in the real costs of using the roads was that less money 
was being spent on road investment, while the number of vehicle 
kilometres was increasing more rapidly. 
 
7.2.6. The expenditure plans show that while expenditure is 
planned to remain at a higher level for the next few years, 
annual increases beyond 1990-91 only take account of inflation. 
If the forecast increase in traffic materialises, then track 
costs will once again be allocating a fixed sum over a larger 
volume of traffic, for which investment is not providing 
sufficient road space. 
 
7.2.7. Apart from the government, several interested parties 
have proposed increased expenditure on roads, most without 
detailed examination or quantification. An exception is a Review 
of Highway Investment Needs (County Surveyors Society 1989). 
 
7.2.8. This report concludes that to provide adequate long 
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term investment requires an increased level of funding of at 
least 20% per annum until the end of the Century. This increase 
applies particularly to local authority roads which in the 
current expenditure plans receive 12% additional funding for 
1989-90, but this is not sustained in 1990-91 where a fall in 
real terms is planned. 
 
7.2.9. Using these findings as a basis for another 
sensitivity test, where spending on national roads is increased 
by 23% (as above) but with local authority roads funding 
increased by 20%, as shown in Table 7.4. 
 
7.2.10. This produces the results shown in Table 7.5. In this 
case few large rigid lorries cover their costs, though the large 
artics do cover their track costs. However, only vehicles of 
less than 10 tonnes GVW produce a margin of 30% to cover 
environmental costs. 
 
7.2.11. The Chancellor of the Exchequer announced increased 
rates of duty on fuel (of about 10%) and on the VED applied to 
large rigid lorries during his budget speech in March 1990, 
which occurred during the period of this study. We have taken 
the adjustments into account in our model, and the results shown 
in Table 7.6 have been produced. As these tests were undertaken 
before the current year's allocations were available, we have 
assumed that all the other allocations are unchanged; 
unfortunately the publication of the detailed allocations did 
produce some significant changes (DTp, 1990). The levels of VED 
announced in the 1990 budget have been applied together with 
increased fuel duty, both adjusted to take account of an assumed 
rate of inflation of 8% for the year. 
 
7.2.12. The effect of the budget revenue changes for 1990-91, 
when applied to the 1989-90 costs, has not only increased total 
revenue from road taxation, but has considerably reduced the 
numbers of HGV's which were not meeting their external costs 
ratios. Most important among these categories are the 32.5 tonne 
four axle articulated outfit. The 31 tonne gross rigid lorry now 
has the highest rate of VED at £3250, which compares with £2450 
and £3100 in the case of maximum weight four and five axle 
artics respectively. Nevertheless, these vehicles and those in 
the  
 
 
Table 7.4. Expenditure on Roads Proposed by County Surveyors 
Soc.
  (by Central and Local Government on the road network). 
_______________________________________________________________ 
         £ million. 
     1989-90  1990-91 onwards  
  
 
Capital     1,919  2,334       
Current    2,777  3,351       
Administration           35            43 
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Police      327    327 
Maintenance    2,415  2,981 
 
Total   4,696  5,685 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Sources: The Allocation of Road Track Costs 1989-90, DTp. 
London, 1989. Review of Highway Investment up to the Year 2001 
on Motorways Primary and Strategic Routes in England (excluding 
London); Report No. 3/7, County Surveyors Society, 1989. 
 
 
Table 7.5 Effect of Increased Expenditure on All Roads.
_____________________________________________________________ 
Vehicle class Tax/cost ratio. 
     DTp   Base    Expenditure  
   figures   figures    +20-23% 
 
Cars + vans   3.4  3.35  2.80 
Buses + coaches  1.1  1.02  0.83 
HGV Rigids 
2 axle 7.5t2.00  1.99  1.65 
2 axle 17t1.14  1.15  0.94 
3 axle 25t1.16  1.14  0.93 
4 axle 31t1.17  1.15  0.94 
HGV Artics 
2+1 axle 25t1.43  1.41  1.15 
2+2 axle 28t1.42  1.43  1.16 
2+2 axle 32.5t1.27  1.28  1.03 
2+3 axle 38t1.36  1.34  1.07 
3+2 axle 38t1.38  1.36  1.09 
3+3 axle 38t1.46  1.45  1.16 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 7.6. Effect of Changes in Duty on Fuel and VED.
   (1990-91 tax rates with 1989-90 level of spending all 
   in 1989-90 prices). 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Vehicle class Tax/cost ratio. 
     DTp   Base    Post 1990 
   figures   figures    Budget 
 
Cars + vans   3.4  3.35  3.34 
Buses + coaches  1.1  1.02  1.04 
HGV Rigids 
2 axle 7.5t2.00  1.99  2.01 
2 axle 17t1.14  1.15  1.17 
3 axle 25t1.16  1.14  1.19 
4 axle 31t1.17  1.15  1.23 
HGV Artics 
2+1 axle 25t1.43  1.41  1.43 
2+2 axle 28t1.42  1.43  1.46 
2+2 axle 32.5t1.27  1.28  1.29 
2+3 axle 38t  1.36  1.34  1.35 
3+2 axle 38t1.38  1.36  1.38 
3+3 axle 38t1.46  1.45  1.47 
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_____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
categories of 17 tonne and 25 tonne rigids still do not cover 
their external costs, the VED adjustment not being sufficient to 
take account of the damaging power of such vehicles. Buses and 
coaches cover their track costs with a small margin. 
 
7.2.13. When the expenditure figures planned for future years 
are used instead of the 1989-90 levels the position reverts to 
one of many categories of HGV's not covering their external 
costs (see Table 7.7). The most important to note are that four 
axle rigids and artics cover their costs by a ratio of 1:1.09, 
while for five axle artics the ratio is 1:1.12. Clearly external 
costs of 30% of track costs are not being covered by the largest 
lorries even though lorries as a whole produce such a margin to 
provide for external costs.  
 
7.2.14 Reference to column (d) in Table 7.7 shows a number of 
discrepancies. In the case of the large rigid lorries the latest 
allocations show a significant change in the distances travelled 
on the various types of road, in the case of four axle rigids 
the increase on 'other' roads (where costs are highest) is 240%, 
as shown in Table 7.8. Another change is that light commercial 
vehicles, those of less than 3.5 tonnes GVW, are now 
incorporated with cars. 
 
7.2.15. The increases in the budget are roughly in line with 
general inflation, with fuel duty rising by 10% (more than 
inflation) and VED increases applied to certain HGV's. It is 
clear that these increases are not sufficient to cover the 
expenditure which is planned for the next few years. As the 
calculations for road expenditure contained in the road track 
costs are based on a three year average, we can predict that the  
Table 7.7. Effect of Changes in Duty on Fuel and VED.
   (1990-91 revenue with increased spending). 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Vehicle class Tax/cost ratio. 
      DTp 89/90  Base    Post 1990  DTp 90/91 
   figures   figures    Budget figures 
     (a)  (b)  (c)   (d) 
 
Cars + vans   3.35  3.35  3.09  3.16 
Buses + coaches  1.07  1.02  1.00  1.18 
HGV Rigids 
2 axle 7.5t2.00  1.99  2.67  2.08 
2 axle 17t1.14  1.15  1.08     1.30 
3 axle 25t1.16  1.14  1.09   1.21 
4 axle 31t1.17  1.15  1.10   1.09 
HGV Artics 
2+1 axle 25t1.43  1.41  1.27   1.42 
2+2 axle 28t1.42  1.43  1.24   1.33 
2+2 axle 32.5t1.27  1.28  1.09   1.20 
2+3 axle 38t  1.36  1.34  1.12   1.21 
3+2 axle 38t1.38  1.36  1.14   1.22 
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3+3 axle 38t1.46  1.45  1.22   1.31 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Note:Col. (a) As 'Allocation of road track costs 1989/90'. DTp, 
 London 1989. 
 Col. (b) model calibration of col (a). 
Col. (c) results expected from adjustment to revenues post 
budget, plus higher level of expenditure on DTp roads. 
Col. (d) actual ratios as per 'Allocation of road track costs 
1990/91'. DTp, London 1990. 
 
 
 
Table 7.8. Changes to Percentage of Distance by Road Class.
           (1989/90 figures in brackets). 
_______________________________________________________________ 
    Motorway  Trunk Principal  Other 
Vehicle class  
 
Cars, vans 12 (12) 16 (18) 33 (36) 39 (34)  
Buses  11 (10) 12 (15) 38 (47) 39 (28) 
 
HGV rigids 
2 axle   21 (21) 22 (24) 31 (34) 26 (21) 
3 axle   18 (21) 25 (28) 30 (35) 27 (16) 
4 axle   23 (27) 27 (34) 26 (29) 24 (10) 
 
HGV artics 
3 axle   29 (34) 29 (31) 26 (25) 16 (10) 
4 axle   44 (48) 33 (33) 16 (15)  7 ( 4) 
5 or more axles 45 (48) 36 (36) 15 (14)  4 ( 2) 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
planned increased levels of expenditure indicate that either VED 
or fuel duty (or both) are likely to increase at above the rate 
of inflation in the next few years, until 1993 at least. 
 
7.2.16. Other adjustments to the rates of VED should result 
from the changes in maximum weights proposed for 1.1.1993. These 
will increase the GVW of three axle rigids from 24.39 tonnes to 
25 tonnes (26 tonnes if fitted with air suspension). More 
importantly, the maximum weight of four axle articulated 
vehicles and drawbar combinations is increased to 35 tonnes from 
32.52 tonnes. 
 
7.2.17. Any likely increase in taxation levels will almost 
certainly be more than offset by an increase in carrying 
capacity of up to 12% for weight constrained loads. This comes 
after the introduction of longer articulated lorries in 1990, 
which increased their volumetric capacity. 
 
 
7.3. The Costs of Accidents.
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7.3.1. The costs of road accidents used by public authorities 
when assessing road schemes are published in HEN1, Highways 
Economic Note No. 1 (Department of Transport 1989c). Until 1988 
the basis for valuation of all categories of casualty had been 
the 'human capital approach', which includes costs of lost 
production, medical services, and a notional allowance for pain 
and grief. This method is still used for non-fatal injury 
accidents but the valuation of a fatality is now based on the 
'willingness to pay' approach. 
 
7.3.2. Research evidence on which to base the change in 
approach has only recently become available. The main British 
study has given very high valuations of between £1.2m and £1.5m 
for ones own life plus £0.5m for ones value to others (Jones-Lee 
1985). This study also gave results indicating that the 
willingness to pay to avoid being seriously injured was about 1% 
of being killed. However, there was a substantial difference 
between the mean and median values from this study (a highly 
right skewed frequency distribution). This means that a minority 
are 'dragging along' the majority of respondents, and the use of 
the median value of £0.8m (1.046m at 1989 prices) may be more 
appropriate. A more recent report recommends a minimum value of 
life of £0.5m (Jones-Lee 1987). 
 
7.3.3. There is some corroboration for these seemingly high 
figures (Marin 1983). A study of high risk occupations gave a 
statistical value of life of £1.25m (at 1981 prices, or £1.95m 
at 1989 prices). 
 
7.3.4. The DTp have used this and other evidence to arrive at 
an average cost. These compare with costs per fatality of 
£610,235 at June 1989 prices, serious casualty £18,497 and 
slight £376. These figures have been used to produce a total 
cost of road accidents in 1988 of £6,155m (at September 1989 
prices). It has been customary to apply one quarter (Department 
of Environment 1976) of these as community costs on the basis 
that much of the costs are borne by road users partly in the 
form of insurance. Given that the approach to the valuation of 
fatalities has been altered the 25/75 split should be re-
examined. 
 
7.3.5 A recent report concerning the costs of damage only 
accidents indicates that the costs of these accidents are also 
under estimated (Taylor M.C., 1990). The comparison of the two 
sets of figures is given in Table 7.9, though those currently 
used in HEN 1 include property damage, whereas Research Report 
256 only includes damage to vehicles. Though these are costs 
incurred by the user in general, there is a significant 
differential between the two estimates. 
 
7.3.6. In order to apply these figures to our model of track 
costs we have broken down the accident costs given in HEN1 by 
severity and urban or non-urban road. The latest available road 
accident figures (DTp 1989d) were used to apply these 
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proportionately to vehicle types (axle configurations in the 
case of HGV's) by their involvement rates on urban and non-urban 
roads (including motorways). 
 
 
Table 7.9. Estimates of Damage to Property (£).
_______________________________________________________________ 
Accident Type     Source 
        RR 256     HEN 1 
 
Serious    3261    1714 
Slight    2246    1224 
All injury  2532    1357 
Damage only    850     632 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Table 7.10. Effect of Accident Costs.
_____________________________________________________________ 
Vehicle class Tax/cost ratio. 
     DTp   Base     Accident Costs 
   figures   figures    (25%)  (47%)  
 
Cars + vans   3.4  3.35  2.39  1.91 
Buses + coaches  1.1  1.02  0.87  0.78 
HGV Rigids 
2 axle 7.5t2.00  1.99  1.50  1.23 
2 axle 17t1.14  1.15  1.09  1.05 
3 axle 25t1.16  1.14  1.06  0.99 
4 axle 31t1.17  1.15  1.07  1.00 
HGV Artics 
2+1 axle 25t1.43  1.41  1.25  1.14 
2+2 axle 28t1.42  1.43  1.29  1.18 
2+2 axle 32.5t1.27  1.28  1.21  1.15 
2+3 axle 38t  1.36  1.34  1.25  1.19 
3+2 axle 38t1.38  1.36  1.27  1.20 
3+3 axle 38t1.46  1.45  1.33  1.24 
_____________________________________________________________ 
7.3.7. The results are given in Table 7.10.  The cost ratios 
of most lorries are substantially reduced, though as the largest 
lorries spend most time on high quality non-urban roads their 
involvement rates tend to be lower than two axle rigid vehicles. 
Buses and coaches clearly do not cover their track costs which 
is largely due to fairly high involvement rates of buses in 
urban areas. The results demonstrate vividly the risks 
associated with motorcycles where the cost ratio falls from 
2.3:1 to 0.36:1. 
 
7.3.8 In order to establish whether 25% of accident costs was 
still a realistic proportion to be borne by the community, we 
have re-worked the figures given in HEN 1 in a form so that they 
can be compared with earlier years. We have then applied the 
proportions borne by the community used when the one quarter 
estimate was establish (DoE 1976). At that time it was estimated 
that the road user bore half the cost of lost production and all 
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property costs. In the case of pain and grief the portion borne 
by the user was estimated as 20% in the case of a fatality, 80% 
if the accident resulted in serious injury, and 100% if slight 
injury. These figures are shown in Table 7.11. 
 
7.3.9 A weighted average of the costs of the different types of 
accident was then calculated from the breakdown of costs in 
Table 7.12. On this basis the proportion borne by the community 
would now be considerably higher at 47% of the total accident 
costs. This figure has been used for another sensitivity test 
which shows many categories of goods vehicles not covering their 
costs if accident costs are taken into consideration (see Table 
7.10). 
 
7.3.10 In practice, the DTp have never taken these accident 
costs borne by the community into consideration when calculating 
road track costs, even though the Armitage Committee recommended 
that they should be included. The main reason for this is 
because other sectors of the community do not specifically bear 
their accident costs. Given the enormous sums involved resulting 
from road accidents, and the very high value placed on life by 
recent studies, the current approach should be re-examined. 
 
 
Table 7.11. Percentage of Accident Costs Borne by the User.
________________________________________________________________
_ 
     Cost element 
Type of  Lost  Medical &  Pain & Police 
Property 
Accident  Output Ambulance  Suffering 
 
Fatal   50      0   20     0     100 
Serious    50      0   80     0     100   
Slight    50      0  100     0     100 
Damage only   -      -   -     0     100 
________________________________________________________________
_ 
Source: Department of Environment. Transport Policy:A 
Consultation Document. HMSO, London, 1976. 
 
 
 
Table 7.12. Costs Borne by Community or User (£).
______________________________________________________________ 
     Cost element 
Type of  Lost  Medical &  Pain & Police 
Property 
Accident  Output Ambulance  Suffering 
 
Fatal 148741   1108   457681  410    2380 
Community (72%) 74370   1108   366145  410       0  
User (28%) 74370      0    92536      0    2380 
           
Serious    2340    2400    14480  330    1860
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Community (32%)  1170   2400     2896  330       0  
User (68%)  1170      0    11584      0    1860 
 
Slight      30    120      270  250    1340 
Community (19%)    15    120         0  250  0  
User (81%)    15      0      270    0    1340  
 
Damage only    0  0    0   80     690 
Community (10%)     0      0         0   80  0  
User (90%)     0      0        0    0     690  
________________________________________________________________
_ 
Sources: Department of Environment. Transport Policy:A 
Consultation Document. HMSO, London, 1976. 
Department of Transport. Highways Economic Note 1. DTp, 
London,1989. 
 
 
7.4 Overloading.
 
7.4.1 In a previous study the evidence on the overloading of 
goods vehicles was examined (Fowkes, Nash & Tweddle 1988) and it 
was concluded that the best available evidence was that produced 
as a result of a random survey conducted in Cheshire in 1986 
(Urqhart and Rhodes, 1987). The estimates of the average weight 
and standard axles from this survey compared to those used by 
the DTp is given in Table 7.13. 
 
7.4.2 The figures produced by the Cheshire study are always 
higher than those used by the DTp. When the average GVW and 
standard axle figures from the Cheshire study are used in the 
computer model the costs incurred by these parameters remain the 
same in total, but are re-distributed among different classes of 
vehicle. The tax/cost ratios which result are shown in Table 
7.14, the ratio of the largest rigid lorries changing 
dramatically because they show the greatest propensity to 
overloading. 
 
7.4.3 Dr. Rhodes of Newcastle University has been undertaking 
research into the dynamic effects lorries have on pavements. 
However, we understand that he has not succeeded in obtaining 
funding to allow this potentially fruitful study beyond the 
first stage, so only limited knowledge will be gained from the 
project. 
 
 
 
Table 7.13. Comparison of Lorry Weights- 
  DTp versus Cheshire Survey.
______________________________________________________________ 
HGV axle   Average GVW    Standard axles 
group DTpCheshire  DTp  Cheshire 
   figures studyfiguresstudy 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Rigid 
2 axle<7.5t 4.0 4.220.00470.010 
2 axle>7.5t 8.6431 9.030.18550.226 
3 axle14.6872 14.880.44350.479 
4 axle19.851822.430.65231.030 
 
Artic 
3 axle11.243213.370.14920.232 
4 axle20.137020.920.62060.724 
5 axle26.2627.050.83271.092 
6 axle26.6027.100.49880.697 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Source:- Derived from The allocation of road track costs 
1989/90, and TORG Research Report 64. 
 
 
Table 7.14. Effect of Overloading.
_____________________________________________________________ 
Vehicle class Tax/cost ratio. 
     DTp   Base    Overloading  
   figures   figures 
 
Cars + vans   3.4  3.35  3.35 
Buses + coaches  1.1  1.02  1.12 
HGV Rigids 
2 axle 7.5t2.00  1.99  1.92 
2 axle 17t1.14  1.15  1.14 
3 axle 25t1.16  1.14  1.23 
4 axle 31t1.17  1.15  0.97 
HGV Artics 
2+1 axle 25t1.43  1.41  1.24 
2+2 axle 28t1.42  1.43  1.47 
2+2 axle 32.5t1.27  1.28  1.32 
2+3 axle 38t1.36  1.34  1.31 
3+2 axle 38t1.38  1.36  1.33 
3+3 axle 38t1.46  1.45  1.37 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
7.5.  Cumulative Effects of Sensitivity Tests.
 
7.5.1 The effects of allowing for the increases in road spending, 
accident costs and vehicle overloading are shown in Table 7.15, 
together with adjustment for revenues as a result of the 1990 
budget and the planned increase in spending on roads. In this 
table we have also allocated those elements of cost which DTp 
allocates on the basis of vehicle km using pcu km, for the 
reasons given above (section 4.2). The result suggests that a 
further increase in taxation of the order of 30% is justified in 
overall terms. This is without moving towards a truly marginal 
cost pricing treatment of capital costs, which might require a 
very much higher increase in taxation (see section 3), and 
without questioning the adequacy of the 30% margin to cover 
other social costs. 
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7.5.2. In examining the various categories of vehicle the 
degree by which their total tax revenues should be adjusted 
varies significantly, as shown by the last column in Table 7.15. 
The large articulated lorries all require an increase of around 
the average of 30%. In the case of rigid vehicles, some of which 
currently pay less than the 1.30:1 tax to cost ratio, a few 
categories require substantial tax increases, notably the four 
axle rigid vehicles with which rail competes for some bulk 
traffics should face tax levels 59% higher than they are at 
present. 
 
7.5.3. Buses are another category which significantly 
underpay their true costs on the basis of our calculations, and 
their taxes should be increased by 60%. The major factor in 
buses underpayment is the relatively high costs of accidents in 
which they are involved in urban areas. These estimates do not 
make any allowance for fuel tax rebates to psv operators. 
 
 
Table 7.15. Cumulative Effect of Sensitivity Tests.
_____________________________________________________________ 
Vehicle class Tax/cost ratio. 
     DTp   Base    Cumulative    Min. 
   figures   figures effect Increase 
 
Cars + vans   3.4  3.35  1.85 
Buses + coaches  1.1  1.02  0.81    60% 
HGV Rigids 
2 axle 7.5t2.00  1.99  1.12    16% 
2 axle 17t1.14  1.15  0.97    35% 
3 axle 25t1.16  1.14  0.99    32% 
4 axle 31t1.17  1.15  0.82    59% 
HGV Artics 
2+1 axle 25t1.43  1.41  0.91    43% 
2+2 axle 28t1.42  1.43  1.04    24% 
2+2 axle 32.5t1.27  1.28  1.00    30% 
2+3 axle 38t1.36  1.34  0.96    35% 
3+2 axle 38t1.38  1.36  0.98    33% 
3+3 axle 38t1.46  1.45  1.03    26% 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Notes:   i)Of total accident costs, 47% allocated to track 
costs. 
    ii) Vehicle kilometres converted to pcu kilometres. 
   iii)Vehicle overloading taken into account, as per 
Cheshire study. 
    iv)Increased VED as per 1990 budget, plus fuel increase 
of 10% adjusted for inflation. 
     v)Capital spending on DTp roads increased by 23%.  
 
 
7.6. Vehicle Delay and Congestion.
 
7.6.1. It has long been recognised that every vehicle on the 
road tends to delay others to some extent, slower moving lorries 
tending to delay more vehicles to a greater extent than cars. 
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However, the power to weight ratios of HGV's have been 
increasing in recent years, and as average speed differentials 
of traffic narrow vehicle delay is reduced, and theoretical lane 
capacity is increased. It is sometimes argued that, since delays 
are imposed by one vehicle on others, delay costs are 
internalised from the point of view of the road system as a 
whole. Nevertheless, there remains a divergence between the 
marginal cost of a trip (including delays imposed on all other 
vehicles) and the average cost, and this properly forms part of 
the external costs of road transport (Walters 1961). 
 
7.6.2 A number of reports have attempted to calculate the cost of 
congestion. One produced valuations for various types of road at 
three levels of capacity utilisation (Buchanan 1984). We have 
recalculated these figures converting from passenger kilometres 
to pcu kilometres, and to 1989 prices, as shown in Table 7.16. 
 
7.6.3 From Table 7.16 it is apparent that congestion costs are 
much higher in urban areas rather than on the inter-urban routes 
where rail is competing for long distance freight and passenger 
traffic. They will also be lower at night than during the 
daytime. However, many long distance movements have trip ends 
within urban areas, though this part of the journey may be made 
by road whether the mode used for the trunk movement is road or 
inter-modal. It is also the case that a considerable proportion 
of delays are created by roadworks or accidents, and these 
delays should be charged to the vehicles which cause them. 
 
 
Table 7.16. Resource Cost Saving from Road Congestion per PCU 
Kilometre. (In 1989 pence). 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Road type        Capacity utilisation 
        70%  90% 100% 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Rural 
Motorway      2.57   3.22   5.15  
All purpose dual carriageway  1.93   2.57   3.22  
Single carriageway (10m)   2.57   3.86   5.15  
Single carriageway ( 7m)   2.57   3.22   3.86  
 
Urban 
Suburban dual carriageway  5.15   8.37  10.94  
Suburban single carriageway  8.37  14.16  18.66  
Urban non-central   10.30  17.38  23.17  
Urban central    19.95  37.97  53.41  
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
7.6.4     Calculation of appropriate congestion charges would 
require a knowledge of the distances run by each vehicle type by 
type of road and level of capacity utilisation. We know of no 
adequate source of data on this. In any event, congestion delays 
should only be included in longrun marginal cost to the extent 
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that they are not offset by increased road capacities. What 
should be included in any event is the delay caused by heavy 
goods vehicles to other vehicles even on uncongested roads. We 
know of no evidence on this since a study back in 1969 (Everall 
1969) and the power to weight ratios and general performance of 
lorries have changed considerably in recent years. 
 
 
7.7. Environmental Effects.
 
7.7.1 The major environmental effects of traffic are noise, 
visual intrusion and pollution. HGV's are the worst offenders in 
the first two of these, and produce objectionable smoke if not 
properly maintained. However, in total cars produce far more air 
pollutants than lorries, though this situation will change in 
the U.K. as car emissions are reduced and commercial vehicles 
will produce a much greater proportion of the total traffic 
pollution (Fergusson Holman & Barlett, 1989). See Table 7.17. 
Most of the reductions in car exhaust emissions come as the 
result of fitting catalytic converters required from 1992. These 
have the effect of converting virtually all the pollutant gases 
into carbon dioxide which is less harmful, but nevertheless a 
'greenhouse' gas. 
 
7.7.2 The current EC proposals for levels of emissions from 
commercial vehicles are given in Table 7.18. They are similar to 
those planned for the U.S.A. Their effect will be to increase 
the cost of large automotive diesel engines in the interim 
period by between 10 and 15%, with a further 10% to meet the 
1996 standard. However, many of the largest engines currently 
available may meet the interim standards and those that cannot 
easily be made to do so may be deleted from manufacturers lists. 
The effect on fuel consumption will be an increase of about 5% 
in the interim period, and a further 5% to 7% after 1996 though 
the latter will also require fuel with a lower sulphur content 
(Cunningham 1990). 
 
Table 7.17.  Changes in the Percentage of Commercial Vehicle  
    Pollution.
________________________________________________________________
_ 
Year       1988       2020 
           Low     High 
Pollutant 
NOx     44   75  76 
CO      4   10  12 
CO2     20   27  33 
HC      6   11  18 
________________________________________________________________
_ 
Source: Derived from Fergusson et al. Atmospheric Emissions from 
the Use of Transport in the U.K. World Wildlife Fund for Nature, 
Godalming, 1989.  
Table 7.18. Mode Measurement of Diesel Emissions. (Grammes) 
________________________________________________________________ 
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Type of emission: CO2  HC  NOx  Particulates 
Engine output (Kwh):      0-85  85+ 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
EC 10/1990 11.2  2.4  14.4   -   - 
EC 10/1992  4.5  1.1   9.0  0.63  0.36 
EC 10/1996  4.0  1.1   7.0  0.3  0.15 
 
USA 1991   15.5  1.3   5.0  0.34 
 0.34 
USA 1994   15.5  1.3   5.0  0.13 
 0.13 
________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Motor Transport, Vol 135, No. 4423, p6. 
 
 
7.7.3 Development of techniques to place money values on the 
environmental effects of road traffic has received new impetus 
from the publication of the Pearce report in 1989 (Pearce & 
Markandya, 1989). A variety of methods exists (Nash and Bowers, 
1988). In the case of damage to buildings and agriculture, the 
costs of offsetting the damage, or replacing the lost production 
may be estimated. For the amenity effects of noise, air 
pollution and visual intrusion, either revealed preference 
methods (based for instance on the relative house prices in 
areas of different levels of disturbance) or stated preference 
methods (using hypothetical questions regarding the willingness 
to pay to avoid disamenity) may be used.    
 
7.7.4 The results of various studies into the cost of traffic 
noise are given in Table 7.19. These were estimated using the 
Hedonic Property Prices technique, which compares values of 
houses in situations where the level of traffic noise is 
different. From these results we can deduce that a change of one 
unit of Leq (the equivalent continuous sound level) equals half 
a percentage change in house prices. 
 
7.7.5. The large variations found in Table 7.19 are 
replicated in similar studies of aircraft noise. In general it 
has been found that depreciation of prices per unit in noise 
increases with the noise level itself. One exception is the most 
recent study of British aircraft noise, which concluded that 
house prices in the vicinity of Manchester airport were 
unaffected by aircraft noise when other factors were properly 
taken into account (Pennington, Topham & Ward, 1988). 
 
7.7.6. Similar studies have been used in North American 
cities to estimate the cost of air pollution in terms of 
property prices. Of course not all air pollution emanates from 
motor vehicles. The results of such studies indicate that a one 
per cent increase in sulphation levels will result in falls in 
property values of between 0.06 and 0.12. In the case of 
particulates the range is 0.05 to 0.14 per cent of property 
values. Where more than one pollution variable is being 
measured, then property prices fall between 0.09 and 0.5 per 
cent (Pearce & Markandya, 1989). 
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Table 7.19. The Impact of Traffic Noise on House Prices.
        (per cent of house price). 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 Location     Impact of one unit change in 
         Leq 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
United States, 
 North Virginia      0.15 
 Tidewater       0.14 
 North Springfield      0.18-0.50 
 Towson       0.54 
 Washington     0.88 
 Kingsgate       0.48 
 North King Country     0.30 
 Spokane       0.08 
 Chicago       0.65 
 
Canada, Toronto      1.05 
 
Switzerland, Basle      1.26 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Source: Pearce D.W., and Markandya A. Environmental Policy 
Benefits:Monetary Valuation. OECD, Paris 1989. 
 
 
7.7.7. In applying any estimate of the effect of traffic 
noise and exhaust pollution on house prices to the total of road 
track costs, it is necessary to note that most of these costs 
will be incurred in urban areas. They will have a lower effect 
on the costs of long distance movements over rural trunk roads. 
As most of the population is concentrated in urban areas similar 
arguments apply to the pollution effects on health. 
 
7.7.8. A Swedish study based on the costs of achieving target 
reductions in pollution by alternative means has estimated the 
emissions from vehicles (a weighted average of NOx, HC and CO) 
to be valued at between 10 and 80 SEK (£0.95-£7.61) per kilogram 
(Hansson and Nilsson, 1989). The sum used for evaluation 
purposes by the researchers was 15 SEK (£1.43). 
 
7.7.9. Air pollution, especially in the form of acidification 
has widespread effect on the value of agricultural crops. 
However, one study of soyabeans found that a 50% reduction in 
wet acid deposition from acid rain would increase the value of 
the crop by only 0.5% (Pearce and Markandya, 1989).  
 
7.7.10. On the other hand, the total cost to the Netherlands 
of air pollution has been estimated at between Gld 580-688 
million per annum (1984 prices). Damage to the German forestry 
sector has also been estimated at DM 2.3 billion (Pearce & 
Markandya, 1989). 
 
7.7.11. A possible area of cost of air pollution which may be 
overlooked, but which may be significant, is that of household 
soiling. This is mainly the costs of cleaning particulate  
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deposits on walls and windows, and increased painting of 
surfaces. 
 
7.7.12. Allocating the external costs of pollution of various 
types to the numerous categories of vehicle is complex. It is 
apparent that most costs would be borne by people in urban 
areas, and large vehicles on long distance journeys may be 
allocated relatively small proportions of the total cost of 
pollution. 
 
7.7.13.   Current evidence on the appropriate valuation of the 
environmental costs of transport is not adequate for robust cost 
allocations to be undertaken. However, a recent report to TRRL 
(so far unpublished) recommended that more work should be 
undertaken on this subject. SACTRA is also currently 
investigating this issue, and one of the authors of this paper 
in evidence to them argued that a combination of stated 
preference techniques with the house price approach (posing 
hypothetical questions about the willingness to pay for 
alternative houses with known levels of disamenity) would be a 
potentially fruitful little explored approach (Nash, ed,1990).  
 
7.7.14.   Over and above all these factors lies the major 
problem of the greenhouse effect. If it is accepted that the 
costs of this are so great that action has to be taken to reduce 
the buildup of greenhouse gases to an acceptable level, then it 
is likely that the growth of road transport will have to be 
constrained. An obvious approach to this would be a further 
increase in road taxation. Such an approach to transport policy 
has already been proposed in the Netherlands, but it is the 
private car on which attention is to be concentrated, with 
priority being given to commercial vehicles (Ministerie van 
Verkeer en Waterstaat, 1989). 
 
 
8. Harmonisation of Taxes in Europe.
 
8.1 Range of Tax Levels in Europe.
 
8.1.1 We have already seen that there may be good reason to 
increase taxes on heavy goods vehicles in Britain over the 
coming years. We have also seen that levels of taxation in the 
various countries of the EC vary enormously, but are generally 
substantially less than in Britain. The question then arises as 
to the possible effects of tax harmonisation within the EC. 
 
8.1.2. Most countries have a two tier system as in the U.K., 
with the majority of revenues raised from a tax on fuel (which 
is related to use of the vehicle), and a fixed licence fee per 
year similar to our VED. Currently British registered lorries 
pay more VED than in any other country, and we also have one of 
the highest rates of fuel duty. Naturally this has led to calls 
for harmonisation of taxes between the member states, in order 
that competition may take place on equal terms. 
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8.1.3  In an ideal world, the level of taxation would vary 
between countries according to the costs in the country 
concerned. Lorries, wherever they were registered would pay 
taxes according to the mileage run in each country at the level 
appropriate to the country concerned. However, this would 
require lorries to be fitted with reasonably sophisticated 
equipment to monitor the mileage operated in each country. We 
believe that electronic tachographs would cost about Dm300 per 
vehicle, or Dm1 billion for the international fleet alone (based 
on an estimated 16.5 million commercial vehicles in EC 
countries, and up to 20% of these would at some stage be used on 
international journeys). Although this would represent the most 
appropriate interpretation of the "territoriality principle", 
the EC appears to accept that it will not be feasible in the 
short run. What is more likely in the short term then is some 
attempt to harmonise actual tax structures and levels between 
countries. This is the subject to which we now turn. 
 
8.1.4. Although it would probably be the case that such a 
harmonised tax regime would involve both a VED and a fuel tax 
element, we have chosen to represent it as a single harmonised 
tax on fuel. In most countries fuel tax dominates the tax take 
from heavy vehicles; it has advantages in terms of relatively 
simple administration and resistance to fraud. It has been 
suggested as a Europe-wide approach because it makes allocation 
of revenues by territoriality relatively simple. We have 
undertaken some sensitivity tests on the revenues which would be 
generated by various levels of duty on fuel, without any VED 
being applied.  The results are shown in Table 8.1. The EC 
Commission is currently proposing a level of duty in a bracketed  
 
Table 8.1. Fuel Taxation.
_____________________________________________________________ 
Vehicle class Tax/cost ratio. 
      
Derv tax      a)    b)    c)    d) 
(p/litre)    DTp.  .1782 .2535 .1450 
 
Cars + vans   3.4  3.4  3.4  3.4 
Buses + coaches  1.1  0.98  1.40  0.80 
HGV Rigids 
2 axle 7.5t2.00  1.73  2.46  1.41 
2 axle 17t1.14  0.73  1.04  0.59 
3 axle 25t1.16  0.70  1.00  0.57 
4 axle 31t1.17  0.73  1.04  0.60 
HGV Artics 
2+1 axle 25t1.43  1.09  1.56  0.89 
2+2 axle 28t1.42  1.15  1.63  0.93 
2+2 axle 32.5t1.27  0.91  1.30  0.74 
2+3 axle 38t1.36  1.00  1.42  0.81 
3+2 axle 38t1.38  1.06  1.51  0.86 
3+3 axle 38t1.46  1.30  1.85  1.06 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Note: a) Assumes VED rates as published in the Allocation of 
Road Track Costs 1989/90. In b), c) and d) VED is assumed to 
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have been abolished. 
 
range of 285-300 ecu/ltr (16.71-17.72p/ltr). The current UK duty 
is outside this range at 19.02p/ltr. 
 
8.1.5. If the base vehicle which must cover its road costs is 
taken to be a 38t artic with a 2+3 axle configuration, then the 
level of tax would need to be increased by 3% (ignoring any 
external costs). However, on this basis some large rigids would 
pay only 70% of their road track costs. 
 
8.1.6. If fuel duty is increased by 47% to 25.35p per litre 
then all vehicles will at least cover their track costs, the 
largest artics by a considerable margin, though the large rigids 
(with whom rail is in competition for some bulk movements) only 
just. If the EC were to  decide on a tax system based on fuel 
duty only, then it should be at a rate substantially higher than 
those which currently prevail within the Community if vehicle 
revenues are to cover costs. 
 
8.1.7. Among the proposals for future taxation is an 
averaging of the current state taxes. This could produce a duty 
of about 14.5p per litre, a much lower figure than the current 
U.K. tax. In this case the vast majority of commercial vehicles, 
as well as buses and coaches, would pay considerably less than 
their track costs. A VED type tax could redress the balance (at 
least for a vehicle covering the average distance in its class) 
if introduced at a high enough level, but if this was also to be 
averaged across the EC states as a compromise then operators of 
commercial vehicles in the U.K. would find their road taxes 
considerably reduced. In the case of international journeys, it 
is also unlikely that vehicles would cover their track costs, 
possibly influencing mode choice decisions for interstate flows 
of traffic. Obviously, most of these problems could be overcome 
if the level of fuel duty were set towards the upper end of the 
range found within Europe.  
 
8.1.8. In the foregoing statement we have made the 
presumption that the costs of the provision and maintenance of 
roads is the same throughout Europe. Obviously some factors 
vary. Winter maintenance costs will be considerably more in some 
parts of northern Europe than in the south. More importantly, 
different methods of construction and maintenance may achieve 
lower whole life costs for road provision, and these costs may 
be spread over different volumes of traffic of various profiles 
in terms of composition of vehicles.  This simply reinforces the 
need to preserve a system which allows for different tax levels 
in the various member states. 
 
8.1.9. In order to allow individual countries within the EC 
to keep their own system and level of taxation, and recoup 
revenues from foreign vehicles using the roads, a 
'territoriality taxation system' is proposed for international 
road transport. The system is currently under investigation by 
consultants, and the results are not yet available. 
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8.1.10. We believe that the data being produced will show that 
allocated track costs per 1000 vehicle kilometres in the UK are 
among the lowest in Europe. Once again, this reflects the high 
traffic volumes combined with relatively low levels of 
investment in this country. Under the principles of the 
territoriality system this means that when UK registered 
vehicles travel on the continent, a relatively large transfer 
payment would have to be made to a foreign government compared 
to that for a foreign lorry covering the same distance on 
British roads. 
 
8.1.11. Total inter-state transfer payments will be based on 
surveys of the use of one nations roads by vehicles registered 
in other countries. It is not clear how these payments will be 
re-charged to the vehicles actually engaged in international 
transport, but if it is not done in an equitable manner then 
unfair competition between hauliers of different countries will 
arise, and this will also have an effect on mode choice 
decisions.   
 
 
8.2 Preferred Policy Options of the EC Commission.
 
8.2.1 Our understanding is that, though the detailed policy has 
not been decided, the attitude of the Commission staff is to 
promote a harmonisation policy which would raise sufficient 
revenue (in the form of fuel duty) to cover the 'average' road 
infrastructure costs of the EC members as a whole. This should 
also cover the variable costs of infrastructure provision 
(including maintenance, police and renewal costs). Countries 
which currently have tax levels above the EC average such as the 
UK, would be allowed to retain them if they wished to do so.  
 
8.2.2 Problems which remain, apart from Benelux countries having 
low fuel duty and UK/Eire high duty, are that the calculation of 
'average' infrastructure cost may be dragged down by countries 
such as Portugal which spend little on roads. On the other hand 
France and Italy have extensive networks of toll roads, which 
lower the average infrastructure expenditure of the respective 
governments while retaining duty income from fuel used by 
vehicles on the toll roads. 
 
8.2.3 Currently there are no plans to propose a federal/state 
road infrastructure system similar to that in the USA. This is 
thought to be politically impossible in the foreseeable future. 
 
8.2.4 The objective of the EC Commission in its harmonisation 
policy is to eliminate distortions in the market (not only in 
transport), and to cover the cost of infrastructure. Their 
thinking is also to apply environmental costs to road traffic. 
This, it is thought, would double road taxes, but they are not 
yet able to calculate the basis for the tax levels. 
 
8.2.5 In the case of international haulage, harmonisation in the 
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technical and social fields is almost complete, represented by 
the 40 tonne 'Eurotruck' and the tachograph and plating 
regulations. However, in the fiscal field much remains to be 
done, and Germany will not agree to liberalise until it is done. 
 
8.2.6 Even without full harmonisation on vehicle taxation, 
liberalisation is proceeding (with objections from Germany), and 
all EC quota restrictions should be removed by 1/6/1993. As from 
1/7/1990 cabotage permits became available, and it is hoped that 
cabotage will be freely undertaken by 1993. 
 
8.2.7 Differences in costs and duty revenues for the different 
states arise when lorries from one country operate on another's 
roads. Article 10 of Document 700/16 puts forward the 
'territoriality principle' whereby the imbalances would be 
transferred via an EC fund, the members having rejected direct 
inter-state tax transfers. 
 
8.2.8 Although the territoriality system transfers balances 
between states, it does not automatically debit or credit the 
individual vehicles and operators concerned. Unless this is 
done, operators in low cost states will still benefit, and the 
Commission does not have the powers to direct domestic 
legislation within member states so that the adjustment occurs. 
This means that in practice, there will be unfair competition 
between the haulage companies of different states, and this may 
also influence mode choice decisions. The degree of unfair 
competition will depend in part on the range of fuel duties 
applied in different states as most international operations 
will involve purchase of some fuel in a foreign country. 
 
8.2.9 In general, the EC favour remissions for combined transport 
operations. They have allowed aid to be given to the 
construction of terminals for some time, and now this has been 
extended to systems as well. 
 
 
9. Conclusions.
 
9.1.1   We have seen that there are a number of respects in 
which the current British system of allocating road track costs 
fails to measure accurately the long run marginal costs of 
increases in traffic of various types of vehicle. These may be 
summarised as: 
- charging capital costs on an inappropriate "pay-as-you-go" 
basis 
 
- failing to allow adequately for the extra costs imposed by 
heavy vehicles in terms of pavement thickness, lane width, 
gradient, curvature and bridge strength. 
 
- failure to include quantifiable public costs of accidents 
 
- failure to allow for overloading. 
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- use of vehicle km rather than pcu km for the allocation of 
some elements of cost. 
 
- failure to allow for environmental costs (except by 
maintenance of an arbitrary 30% margin between revenue and 
allocated costs). 
Allowing for the last three effects alone, plus the current 
plans for increased spending on roads would be sufficient to add 
some 30% to the taxes on heavy lorries. A proper treatment of 
capital costs could add a much greater amount to the charge. 
 
9.1.2.    Although methods of quantifying environmental costs 
have greatly improved in recent years, and there is much 
interest in the subject at the present time, no study to value 
the environmental effects of heavy goods vehicles has yet been 
sponsored. We belief that this is a promising area, and that the 
appropriateness of the current 30% margin to allow for 
environmental effects could now be tested, although some 
aspects, such as the greenhouse effect, would probably defy 
monetary valuation. 
 
9.1.3.     Despite the above arguments which suggest that heavy 
goods vehicle taxation in Britain is probably still to low, it 
must be said that the methods of allocating costs in Britain are 
more sophisticated than in most other EC countries, and the 
degree of cost coverage much higher.  There is a real danger 
that moves towards harmonisation of tax levels in EC countries 
may lead to an undesirable reduction in the current U.K. level. 
This should be resisted, on the basis both that current charges 
in other European countries are generally too low, and that 
appropriate taxation requires different levels of tax, within a 
harmonised general structure, according to the costs in the 
country concerned. However, if the desire for harmonisation 
should lead to a reduction in road taxes, then there would be a 
clear case for the government to take responsibility for meeting 
a part of the infrastructure costs of competing modes, as is 
provided for in current EC legislation.  
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